Shield, Sword, Or Machicolation by Clark, William R.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 23 
Issue 3 June 1958 Article 3 
1958 
Shield, Sword, Or Machicolation 
William R. Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William R. Clark, Shield, Sword, Or Machicolation , 23 MO. L. REV. (1958) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
SHIELD, SWORD, OR MACHICOLATION1
W=~Anm R. CLAMi*
"Employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing."2 These sixteen
seemingly simple words were approved by the members of the Missouri
constitutional convention3 and subsequently adopted February 27, 1945.
4
However, it may be noted that the provision as it was originally approved
differs from the now adopted provision as it appears in the official form
in that the word "That" was added as a prefix thereto.5 If "That" were
the only "latent" problem of construction and interpretation which the
now seventeen words present, there would be little need for the minds
of men to give but a passing thought to such a seemingly simple sentence,
but "That" is not, as we shall see, the problem by any means.
This article is written for the prime purpose of determining, if possi-
ble, by reviewing only the transcript of the last constitutional convention,
whether this provision was meant to grant of and in itself any "new"
judicially enforceable rights to the "employee" and the "representa-
*Member of the Missouri Bar; B.S., University of Missouri, 1947, LL.B. 1956.
In private practice, Columbia, Missouri; Corporation Counsel, office of the Secretary
of State, State of Missouri.
1. Meaning as applied hereto: "An opening . .. in. .. the roof of a portal,
[the grand and imposing constitution] for [the courts] discharging missiles upon
assailants.... ." WEsTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONAR-r 599 (5th ed. 1944).
2. VERBATITL TRAxSCRIPTON Od PROCEmING or CoxsTruTiAnoA CoNvEN oN 1971
(1944), (hereinafter cited as PRoczmrms).
3. Ibid.
4. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 29.
5. Ibid.
6. Employee defined: (1) "One who works for wages or salary in the service
of an employer;-disting. from official or officer." WErsTEr's COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY
327 (5th ed. 1944). (2) "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter
explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as
an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having
the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor,
or any individual employed by an employer subject to ... [the Railway Labor Act],
or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined." National Labor
Relations Act, § 2(3), 49 STAr. 450, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1952).
(285)
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tives"7 of their choice by the inclusion thereof in article I of the Missouri
constitution, or whether its inclusion therein was only a written assertion
of the then existing rights which added nothing new to the law except
a constitutionally asserted guaranty of protection from future adverse
legislative enactment. By mere reference to footnotes 6 and 7 herein,
one without more could anticipate several acute problems by the sole
fact that the speaker of the words might have command of one definition
and the hearer of the words, the other, or perhaps each might use a
completely different definition acquired from custom or personal usage
with unknown variants; however, for the sake of complex simplicity,
only the two definitions set forth for each word will be applied herein.
They will be hereinafter referred to either as the standard (Webster's)
or Labor's (NLRA) definition where used.
The writer realizes that these debates are only some evidence to be
considered in construing this provision, but these debates were the birth
of this prodigy, and therefore it appears wise to examine this point in
time leaving its progressive environmental development for later con-
sideration.
The debates opened on this provision when the clerk read section I
as it was originally presented to the convention. The section was read
as follows:
SEcTiON I. There shall be no abridgment of the right of employees
to join, organize or remain members of any bona fide labor
organization, and to exercise the right of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing; nor shall any em-
ployee be discriminated against for such union labor activity.,
The presentation of this section and subsequent first substitute therefor
was made by Mr. Wood as follows:
M. WEsLEY: Mr. President, first I want to move the adoption of
this section. Then, in view of the fact that Mr. Reuben Wood is
president of the American Federation of Labor in Missouri and
an outstanding labor man in the United States, I defer to Mr.
Reuben Wood in the presentation of this section.
7. Representatives defined: (1) "Being, or acting as, the agent for another,
esp. by authority." WEsTR's COUEziATr DicTioNARY 845 (5th ed. 1944). (2) "The
term 'representatives' includes any individual or labor organization." National Labor
Relations Act § 2(4), 49 STAT. 450, 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1952).
8. PROCEEMINGS 1931.
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PRESIDENT: Is there a second?
(Motion was seconded by Mr. Wood (of Greene)).
MR. WOOD (OF GREENE): Mr. President, I thank Mr. Wesley for
his very great compliment. First, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to offer
a substitute for Section I.
(Substitute brought forward and read as follows)
PRESIDENT: Mr. Wood, is this a substitute for the Section I?
MR. WOOD (OF GREENE): Section I, yes.
(Clerk read as follows)
SUBsTITUTE No. I FOR SECTION I. Amend File No. 10, page 1, sec-
tion I, Line one to six inclusive, by striking out section one and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"Section I. There shall be no abridgment of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing."
VIR. WOOD (OF GREENE): I move the adoption of the substitute,
Mr. President.
(The motion was seconded by Mr. Wesley.) 9
Mr. Wood then made a long statement involving for the most part
the historical development of labor, and the following comment contained
therein appears noteworthy to point up that from the very beginning
his emphasis was on labor as a group and not upon the individual em-
ployees. He commented as follows:
Mi. WOOD (OF GREENE): Mr. President, Section I-it read in the
report that there shall be no abridgment of employees to join
bona fide labor organizations and to exercise the right of collec-
tive bargaining through representatives of their own choosing,
nor shall any employee be discriminated against for labor union
activities. The Committee has discussed this first section, Mr.
President, and eight members of the Committee have decided to
this substitute which strips the section of all its verbiage and
reduces it to this one simple sentence.
Mr. President, I realize that any legislation or any amendment of
the Constitution that affects labor and that seeks to give labor
more freedom or equal rights with every other organization,
9. Id. at 1932.
19581
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naturally will engender some opposition... (Emphasis added.) 10
.. Organized labor, or the workers of this state are not asking
for any special privileges.... Now, there is some objection to
this section as originally written and I assume the same objection
will be raised against this substitute. I hold in my hand a copy
of the resolution passed by the City Council of Kansas City
opposing the adoption of Section I... and they give as among
their many reasons that it will nullify provisions in our city
charter and the judicial interpretations thereof. This one,
"Whereas a fair interpretation of Section I of said file,
number 10, as applied to Kansas City would permit all
employees of the city to join, organize or remain a mem-
ber of any bona fide labor organization and direct his
idea of collective bargaining and thus nullify the pro-
vision of our city charter and the judicial interpretations
thereof."
Mr. President, there are several thousand city employees in
Kansas City who have been dealing in collective bargaining with
that city for years.'
It is apparent here and throughout the remaining portion of Mr.
Wood's statement that he is using collective bargaining in the broadest
sense so as to include all employer-employee relationships, and he, with-
out defining his terms, emphasized this fact to the delegates.
In the closing comments, Mr. Wood again emphasized that labor
was not asking for any special privileges but rather urged the adoption
thereof as a statement of public policy and stressed that several states
had gone even further in their constitutions. However, a careful reading
of the following comments will indicate Mr. Wood apparently believed
that this provision would give to labor the right to bargain collectively,
but he did not indicate if he expected therefrom a creation of an affirma-
tive duty on the part of the employers of this state or the loss of the
employer's right to discharge his employees for any cause at any time:
So it is Mr. President and members of this Convention, that
members of organized labor are not asking any special privileges.
We're not asking anything but what has been received by every
other group. I feel that this state should adopt Section I as a
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I hold in my hand a communication sent to the country press for
the Missouri Retailers Association. I have inquired as best I
could, the cause of sending this out. The retail merchants and
others I have consulted seemed to know very little about it but
in their open situation they are afraid that if Section I is adopted
immediately every retail merchant in this state will have to
organize employees. Nothing was ever farther from the truth,
but they do admit in their letter, "It is true that more effective
administration and endorsement of either proposal could be ob-
tained by setting up an administrative body in the nature of a
Missouri Labor Relations Act which would correspond with the
National Labor Relations Act."
... Now I do hope that we can get this simple sentence in our
constitution which is a matter of an expression of public policy
and that we can say that as far as we know, there is no other
state in the union that has a clause of this kind except New York
and that Missouri was the second state in the union of the forty-
eight states that established a public policy recognizing the
right, inherent right of workers to organize and bargain collec-
tively.
Now, there are many other states that have other clauses in
their Constitutions, not dealing with collective bargaining....
Mr. President, this is the following language in the New York
Constitution. "Labor not a commodity; hours and wages in
public work; right to organize and bargain collectively. Labor
of human beings is not a commodity nor an article of commerce
and shall never be so construed or considered. No laborer,
workman, or mechanic in the employ of a contractor or sub-
contractor engaged in the performance of any public work shall
be permitted to work more than eight hours in any day nor
more than five days in any week except in cases of extraordinary
emergency.' That is a copy of the provision wage laws passed
under the Hoover Administration in all public building con-
structed by the United States Government, 'Nor shall he be
paid less than the rate of wages prevailing in the same trade
or occupation of the locality within the state where such public
work is to be situated, erected, or used. Employees shall have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing.' It was adopted on November
8, 1938.
I believe that every delegate here thoroughly understands the
implications and the meaning of this section. Our Labor Com-
mittee felt that it would be, that we should reduce the language
of Section I and just slight it and just submit the substitute in
1958]
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one plain sentence which is just as understandable as if you
would write a whole page.
It has not the implications that the section had in the first place
of pointing out something that the workers have a right to do,
the things that they could not be discriminated against for doing
in the way of organization, and I move you, Mr. Chairman, that
the substitute be adopted.12
These were the inceptive thoughts which were injected into the
minds of the delegates, but it cannot be absolutely stated as did Mr.
Wood above that "every delegate here thoroughly understands the im-
plications and meaning of this section" for to do this each would have
to be a labor specialist. However, without more, Mr. Wood's motion was
seconded and adopted as stated:
(The motion was seconded by Mr. Hogan.)
(Clerk read as follows:)
SuBsTrnuTE No. I FOR SECTION No. I. Amend File No. 10, Page 1,
Section 1, Line one to six inclusive, by striking out section one
and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
Section I. There shall be no abridgment of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing.13
Mr. Hanks (JAsPER) then addressed the convention in support of
this substitute. The following comments of Mr. Hanks are considered
helpful to show the way the other delegates were being lead by talk in
terms not capable of common understanding:
... These men only ask this, and organized labor only asks this.
They ask only that labor be permitted to organize, to bargain
collectively. Why, in order that labor may participate with
capital and management in the welfare of this state. That's the
purpose in it....
Labor seeks to participate in the entire social scheme of govern-
ment. Of course by this simple line in our Constitution we do
not establish the right of labor. Those rights are already estab-
lished. By this simple line we do not ordain that organized labor
shall live and continue to exist. Oh no. Those rights were or-
12. Id. at 1937, 1938.
13. Id. at 1938.
[Vol. 23
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dained at the time of the creation of the Federal Constitution.
They will continue to exist....
What is it that we can do then, my friends, if we cannot ordain
and cannot establish it here. We can with honor to ourselves
say that we can do this. We can recognize that labor is here, that
labor has been with us throughout the years, throughout the
centuries. We in Missouri have recognized organized labor be-
cause in doing so we recognize ourselves as a part in parallel of
the great industrial state of Missouri.14
Mr. Wood was then questioned by 1Ir. Shepley concerning the appli-
cation of the state police power to this provision:
Ma. SHEPLEY: Mr. Wood, this right which you seek to have rec-
ognized and protected in this constitutional provision, do you
feel that that is a right which should at all times be subject to the
police powers of the state?
ViR. WooD (OF GREENE): Certainly.
MR. SHEPLEY: Would you have any objection to having that put
in at the end of your section so there would be no objection to it?
MR. WOOD (OF GREENE): That is entirely superfluous.... I only
wish we had all the protective legislation that the corporations
have in this state and this nation. I am merely asking for this to
be inscribed in our Constitution Mr. President, that the State
of Missouri has enunciated by its basic document recognized by
the men and women organized to bargain collectively and not
only that but there is a great reason for it. Collective bargaining
has prevented many many labor disturbances .... i
Again, Mr. Wood is using Labor's terms unknown in definition to
most of the delegates. He continues:
. . . Insofar as the police power was concerned, Mdr. Shepley, any
infraction of the law that may be committed by the employer or
the employee certainly is subject to the police power of the state.
There is no necessity for hampering-this section by injecting such
a sentence in our state Constitution that we cannot enact, cannot
place a provision in our Constitution protecting labor unless it
must be dismerged by a sentence that this law is subject to the
police power. That certainly would insult the labor.16
14. Id. at 1939.
15. Id. at 1940.
16. Id. at 1941.
1958]
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At this point ir. Damron questioned Mr. Wood, and as the following
will point up, Mr. Wood gave what I believe is the first real common
understandable purpose of this constitutional provision insofar as the
non-labor delegate was concerned:
MR. DamoN: Mr. Wood, does the labor now have the right to
organize and bargain collectively in this state?
iR. WOOD (OF GREENE): Oh yes. Everyone knows that. That's
true.
AIR. DAmoN: What rights or powers if any, do you seek to obtain
by this proposal that you do not now have?
Ma. WooD (OF GREENE): Well Mr. Damron, if it is in our state
Constitution we will preclude the possibility and the probability
as has happened in the past. In future sessions of the Legislature,
many bills being introduced seeking to destroy collective bar-
gaining.
A. WOOD (OF GREENE): The two bills in here, the two pro-
posals in here would practically destroy the labor movement if
they are adopted by the Convention and Mr. President, there are
measures in every session of the Missouri General Assembly for
many years, nearly every session, that seek to take away and
hamper the right of men and women to organize and bargain
collectively. If it is in our Constitution, it is . .. a measure of
protection, a measure of recognition that the matter of public
policy that we, the members of organized labor have the same
right to organize and bargain collectively in our own interest
as every other organization and every other group.17
The next interesting development was an amendment offered by
Mr. Shepley which subsequently forced the withdrawal by Mr. Wood
of his original substitute and a re-submission of the second substitute
which was to be later adopted:
AmEN:ENTr No. 1 To SUBSTITrTE No. 1 FOR SECTION I. Amend
File No. 10, amend Substitute 1 for Section I by substituting a
semicolon for the period at the end of said substitute and by
inserting after said semicolon the following words: 'Provided
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and of its municipalities, counties and other political subdi-
visions.
Mit. SiiPLEY: Mr. President, my purpose in putting this-in
suggesting this amendment does not arise out of any feeling on
my part against what we have known today as collective bar-
gaining, the right of employees to organize. It is prompted by
this one purpose or one thought. Whenever, in your Constitution,
you create a right in any individual or group or class, and you
say that that right shall never be abridged, then I think unless
you qualify along the lines of this amendment, you have tied the
hands of your General Assembly to the point where they are
powerless at any future date to legislate in any way on that
subject. Now, I may be wrong, but that is frankly my purpose
and my only purpose in suggesting this amendment .... 18
After a rather lengthy but somewhat collateral discussion, Mr.
Shepley therein indicated that he would not be opposed to a provision
similar to the New York provision. (This is the second mention of the
New York provision by a delegate before the convention, but the first
indication that this provision would be at all acceptable to the opponents
of the Wood substitute.) Judge Moore (opposing the Shepley amend-
ment) questioned Mr. Shepley about the police power of the state as
follows:
Mn. MooRE: What do you mean by police power?
MI. SHFnEPy: I mean the inherent power of the state or any
government having any police power to protect the welfare and
the health, the well being of its people, regulate society in such
a way as to protect the people whom it exists for.
Mn. MoopE: Do you not think that the state would have that
right without your amendment to this section?
Mn. SiFnLEY: I don't think so, Judge. At least, I am in doubt
about it for this reason. The wording of this proposal, this sub-
stitute, says there shall be no abridgment of the right. Now, if
that were worded the way that I believe it is worded in the New
York provision, I wouldn't have suggested this at all. There it
says that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. I would say that would certainly be subject to the
inherent police power of the state, but where you say there
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the fact that that puts it above your control at all, of the General
Assembly.
.. . that is a right which they should have, which they have
exercised, and it is one, as Mr. Wood pointed out, which should
not be brought into question every time the General Assembly
meets.19
The following comments of the several persons indicated are con-
sidered important to point up why the New York provision was sub-
sequently presented to the convention:
MR. WESLEY: Mr. President, I believe that by tacking this amend-
ment on to our substitute, it would simply be an invitation to
the General Assembly to pass some laws against the right of
collective bargaining, and I am absolutely opposed to Mr.
Shepley's amendment....
MR. SHEPLEY: Mr. Wesley, would you have any objection to your
Committee's section reading, 'employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively'?
MR. WEsLEY: Personally, I should not.
M. SHEPLEY: Do you feel you would get anything less in that
sentence than you would get in the one you submitted?
MR. WESLEY: No, I don't.
MR. SHEPLEY: Well, if you make it that way, I will withdraw my
amendment very gladly.
MR. WESLEY: If you will ask Mr. Wood this question?
MR. SHEPLEY: Well, ir. Wood, I beg your pardon, sir, I will
address my question to you. Do you feel that you would get
anything less, what you want, by the statement, 'employees shall
have the right-the inherent right to organize and bargain collec-
tively'?
AIR. WOOD (or GREENE): Well, Mr. Shepley, it would be one
and the same thing.
19. Id. at 1945.
[Vol. 23
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MR. SHEPLEY: Well, the- reason I asked my question, Mr. Wood
is this; that I want you to understand that if you word it the
other way, I will withdraw my amendment. I have no desire to
put it in if it is worded as the New York Constitution is worded.
M . WOOD (or GREENE:) Well, Mr. President, I hope this amend-
ment will not pass. If we adopted this amendment, then any
municipality in this state or the state could pass a law or
ordinance depriving workers of the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
PRESIDENT: Question is on Mr. Shepley's amendment to the sub-
stitute.
(Chorus of 'Question')
PRESIDENT: As many as are in favor of the amendment, let is be
known by saying "aye" . . . Contrary "no". The noes have it.
The amendment is lost. The question is on the substitute. 0
After the amendment failed there subsequently took place an ex-
change of words between Mr. Wood and Mr. Brown which is some
evidence of why this provision was important to labor and again is the
seemingly real purpose for the inclusion of such a provision in the Con-
stitution:
MnR. BRowN (OF CARROLL): I was inquiring as one organization
man to another.
AMn. WooD (OF GREEN): Oh.
Mn. BROWN (OF CARROLL): You know that I would not deny the
right of labor to organize.
MA. WOOD (OF GREENE): I am sure of that.
AM. BRow-N (OF CARROLL): And I know that you would not deny
the right of farmers to organize.
A. WOOD (OF GREENE): No, I wouldn't, Mr. Brown.
Mn. BROWN (oF CARROLL): Now, it would not occur to me to
write into the Constitution the provision that there shall be no
abridgment of the right of farmers to organize, because I don't
think there is anything in the Constitution, either in the Con-
20. Id. at 1945-47.
1958]
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stitution or the statutes, anywhere abridging the right of either
labor or farmers to organize.
MaR. WOOD (OF GRaEa): The trouble is, I fear that you don't
differentiate between employees that have no stock or interest
in a corporation working, and the farmers that work at farming.
Most members of Farm Bureau Federations and the Missouri
Farmers' Association are farm owners. They are, in a word,
businessmen, and the farmers' organizations are really business
organizations. There is no employer or employee consideration
in the farmers' unions. Most of you are employers, and your
functions are to have proper markets so that you may be able to
utilize that market through cooperative action, and the relation
of employer-employee is entirely different from any other organi-
zation. Labor workers have more opposition to organization for
the purpose to protect themselves than any other organizations.
You are really a business organization, and you own your own
business, nine-tenths of it. All these workers work all over the
country, and they work for one employer after another, and they
own no interest in the business only their skill and ability to
produce.
Ma. BROWN (OF CARROLL): Of course, in matters of organization,
farmers are subject to the same legislative consideration as
Labor or any other group?
Ma. WooD (OF GpxmqE): Yes, but, Mr. Brown, I don't think there
has ever been a measure introduced in this General Assembly
that questioned in anywise the right of farm organizations to
organize and carry on their natural functions of the business.
There never has been any legislation introduced in this Legisla-
ture trying to deprive you of your right to carry on your normal
business activities, but on the other hand, in almost every
session, there is some type of legislation that seeks to harm,
hamper and prevent organizations of workers from carrying out
the regular functions and duties of an organization, and I don't
know of any other organization, farm organizations or profes-
sional men, or any other avocation of life that is in the same
category as employer-employee relations that now exist between
Labor and their employers.
MR. BROWN (OF CARROLL): I think you are right so far as organi-
zations are concerned. I do not think that the Legislature has
ever denied the right of farmers to organize. At the same time I
do not think that they deny the right of Labor to organize.
Ma. WooD (OF GRaEE=): Well, Mr. Brown, we have in the last
session of the Legislature-five or six states passed legislation,
[Vol. 23
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that if it was administered and carried out to its final conclusion,
it would destroy organized labor... and I can see no reason why
the state or municipality should be accorded the privilege of
denying a man the right that's been recognized for years, to
organize for his own protection. I can't conceive of it.
MR. BROWN (OF CARRoLL): ... I have no particular objection to
this provision as in your substitute, but it just occurs-a ques-
tion occurs as to whether we need to write it into the Constitu-
tion. I seriously question that.
Ma. WOOD (OF GPENE): In the Farm Bureau Federation, the
Missouri Farmers' Association cooperative, as well as other
corporations, you have laws protecting you as a cooperative
organization.... You have laws that protect your organization,
cooperative laws....
Now, there isn't any law that protects organized labor in their
organized structure, and we do not ask for it. I don't think it's
possible. All that Labor asks is that their right, which certainly
is inherent, to organize and bargain collectively should not be
abridged by anyone. I can't conceive that the Congress of the
United States would pass such a law as that, so that's the differ-
ence. Members of organized labor haven't any interest in the
institutions wherein they work. They have no financial interest
unless they desire to buy some stock. They haven't any interest
in the managerial end of the institution.
You are both managers and cooperators and benefactors of that
organization, of your cooperative. That's entirely different from
men who work for wages ... you have laws that protect you,
but we don't.2 '
From the foregoing it is noted that apparently Mr. Wood never in-
tended this provision should or would give any judicial insurance to
the employee that his employer would not or could not discharge him
without thereby being subject to the rise of a cause of action therefor.
Also it would seem that again there is evidence that the provision was
being supported as a "prohibitive" measure against adverse legislative
enactment and therefore was apparently never intended to be a "self-
executing" provision. The convention was adjourned at this point and
was again called to order the next day, May 4, 1944.
21. Id. at 1948-50.
13
Clark: Clark: Shield, Sword, Or Machicolation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The very first action taken on this provision when the convention
reconvened was the Shepley-bargain withdrawal by Mr. Wood of his
controversial substitute and in lieu thereof substitute No. 2 was sub-
mitted as follows:
M .WOOD (OF GREENE): Mr. President with the consent of the
second, I'd like to withdraw the substitute and submit another
in lieu there of which I think would clear up a good deal of the
question.
PREsIDET: Is there objection to the request to withdraw the sub-
stitute? The chair hears none. The substitute will be withdrawn.
(Mr. Wood of Greene sent up another substitute which was read
as follows:)
SUBSTITUTE No. 2 FOR SECTION I. Amend File No. 10, Page 1,
Section I, Line one to six, inclusive; by striking out Section 1 and
inserting in lieu thereof; 'Employees shall have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.'
MR. WOOD (or GREENE): AMr. President, I think it is not neces-
sary for any further discussion on this amendment or this sub-
stitute because I believe every delegate here understands the
wording. This wording was changed on account of the suggestion
being made yesterday of the language of the first substitute in
which it said 'there shall be no abridgment of the right.' This
changes the wording that their employees shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively.
(The motion was seconded by Mr. Hanks.) 22
Before comment could be had concerning the new Wood substitute,
two proposed amendments were presented, one of which was ruled out
as a substitute for a substitute and the other was defeated. Both were
in the nature of "right-to-work" proposals.
Mr. Shepley, who opposed the earlier Wood substitute, opposed the
Hemphill amendment (in substance a "right-to-work" proposal) and
at the same time provided the convention with what he thought the Wood
substitute sought to accomplish. This is also further evidence that the
provision was regarded as "prohibitory":
22. Id. at 1952, 1953.
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MR. SmPLEY: Mr. President,... the only purpose for Mr. Wood's
substitute, as I see it, is this. The assertion of a principle which
should be, I think, freely acknowledged by every person who
believes in the right of individuals to be free plus the fact that
that right seems to have been questioned, seriously questioned,
by a good many people. To say to the individual working person
who in many instances occupies a pretty humble position
economically, that he or she cannot cooperate with his or her
fellow workers in an effort to secure a little better condition of
work to me is inhuman and I can't subscribe to that very simple
matter of justice. [Note: Mr. Shepley is not saying that because
thereof the employer must lose his right to discharge and acquire
an affirmative duty to recognize such unacquired rights.]
Now, that's all that Mr. Wood's substitute seeks to accomplish
is to have us in this Constitution pronounce that principle as
being the principle to be adopted by the people of Missouri,
namely that employees may be free to cooperate with each other
in the securing of better conditions. Now, I don't think we should
go any further than that... I believe that if we put anything in
this Constitution, and I think we should, we should limit it to
the very simple statement which is now contained in Mr. Wood's
substitute which has been changed from the wording that was
contained, to concede to our conception. I think that is a simple
statement to a very fundamental right and when we seek to go
further than that I believe we, are undertaking an impossible
task which should properly be left to the General Assembly of
the State of Missouri. For that reason I rise to oppose the amend-
ment.23
Again before any further comment was made on the new Wood
substitute, Mr. Righter supporting Kansas City offered the following
amendment (later to be withdrawn and another submitted therefor) to
the Wood substitute as follows:
PRESIDENT: Amendment by Mr. Righter.
(The Clerk read as follows:)
AamNMrNT No. 2 TO SuBsTITuTE No. 2 FOR SECTION I. Amend
File No. 10, by amending Mr. Woods' Substitute for Section I, by
changing the period at the end of the sentence to a comma, and
by adding thereto the following: 'provided however that this
23. Id. at 1959.
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Section shall not apply to the state, or any sub-division or muni-
cipality thereof'.
P xsmi_-T: Is there a second?
(The motion was seconded by Mr. Steven.) 24
Mr. Righter and Kansas City were concerned with the possibility
of the Wood substitute requiring the cities to bargain collectively with
their employees. To this belief, Mr. Wood commented:
.. Now,... this amendment to the Constitution, Mr. President;
... does not interfere, does not change the employer-employee
relations as between city employees and municipalities. This
amendment does not require City Governments or municipalities
to deal in collective bargaining with their employees in the same
manner as is required by private employers. The very fact that
a committee representing groups of employee organizations in a
municipality sitting down to a table and thrashing out matters
... with reference to wages, hours, and working conditions with-
out signing a contract, is not in the same category at all with
private employment. 5
Is Mr. Wood inferring now that the amendment will 'require' collec-
tive bargaining in private industry? However, whatever the case may
be, Mr. Wood considered the Righter amendment as positively preventing
a city employee from belonging to a labor union, as follows:
A. RIGHTER: If I understand you correctly, Mr. Wood, you say
that your Substitute does not apply to the state and subdivisions
of the state in any case, is that correct?
M. WOOD (or G E E): To change their present methods, no,
but it will prevent a city or the state from telling a citizen of the
state that 'you cannot join a labor union', and neither can the
Federal Government. I hope that we will never adopt a basic,
in adopting our basic law, I hope that we will never place in that
basic document a provision that will authorize the officials
elected or appointed of any municipality to say to any citizen that
'You shall not join a labor union', and that's what your amend-
ment will do.
Mn. RIGHTER: Well, is it your thought that after this amendment
is adopted, if it is adopted, that employees will still not have the
right to bargain collectively with the Government?
24. Id. at 1962.
25. Id. at 1962, 1963.
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AIR. WOOD (OF GREENE): Substitute, they will still go on as they
have in the past, and there can be no other way. The city cannot
sit down and sign a wage agreement with a group of men to the
exclusion of someone else.
AIR. WooD (oF GREENE): If the amendment to the Substitute is
adopted, Mr. Righter, your City Council and municipality will
have the power and authority to say to any citizen that if he shall
make application for employment that, 'You shall not belong to
a labor union,' and they will have no power to do it.
AIR. RIGHTER: Then your thought is that this Substitute that you
have offered does deprive the city of that power, is that correct?
Mn. WooD (or GREENE): It deprives the city, yes, of that power
to tell any citizen that he cannot belong to a labor union.
MR. RIGHTER: I don't know that the city is so much concerned
with the question whether they join an organization but the city
is very much concerned that they shall not have, by constitutional
fiat, the absolute right to bargain collectively with the city or
with the state for that matter.26
MR. MOORE: Your objection then, is not to the right to organize,
but to the right to bargain?
MR. RIGHTER: I have no objection in the world to the employees
organizing, but I do object to putting in the Constitution a limita-
tion upon the state's sovereignity, that it must concede them the
right to organize whether it wants to or not, that is to say
organize for the purpose of collective bargaining.
MR. MOORE: Then, Mr. Righter, did you mean what you said a
moment ago, that the city should have the right to say to its
employees that, "You shall not join a certain organization and
work for the city?"
Ma. RIGHTER: Well, I think the city-I think the state should
have the right to say if it wants to. I should not be prevented in
26. Id. at 1963, 1964.
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this Constitution from saying that its employees shall not or-
ganize into a collective bargaining unit, and if that is true with
respect to the state, that is true with respect to every govern-
mental sub-division of the state.2
7
Do not these comments imply that some of the members believed
that an affirmative duty on the part of the employers of this state would
be created if the new Wood substitute was adopted? However, I believe
the following statement by Mir. Wood negates the intent to create any
new rights not presently in existence and therefore if there was not
at this time (1944) an affirmative duty on the employer, the Wood
substitute would not create one. Note Mr. Wood's statement:
hIt. WooD (OF GmEE): Gentlemen, I hope this amendment will
not be adopted. Now, there is nothing in our Constitution now
that prohibits either private or public employees from organizing
and bargaining collectively. The state does not, the Bill of Rights
in our Constitution does not permit representatives of the state
or municipality to sign a contract with a group of employees to
the exclusion of any other citizen. Our Federal Constitution does
not permit the Federal Government to sign an agreement in
collective bargaining with a group of federal employees to the
exclusion of any other citizen. Under the Hoover Administration,
we passed a provision rate of wage law for all public construc-
tions. There was nothing in that law that required anyone work-
ing on a public construction to be a member of organized labor
or not a member. That is as far as the Federal Government can
go under our Constitution. We now have the right to organize,
and as we are trying to draft this basic document in the interest
of all the people, it certainly is not fair to say the least, that you
would single out the largest group of the state and force upon
them an inhibition that our present Constitution does not provide.
In other words, if you adopt this amendment, you will say to
the employees of this state, both private and public that, 'You
have had the right to organize all these years, but now this clause
in the new Constitution gives you the right to organize in private
industry but not in public industry, not as public employees.'
That, 'Our present Constitution all these years has not permitted
a state or municipal official to discharge an employee because he
does, or does not belong to a labor union, but now this new
clause provides that you may work, may be employed by the
state or a municipality but we are now giving the state and
27. Id. at 1965, 1966.
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municipality the right to say, you shall not belong to a labor
union in consideration of your employment.'
Mr. President, I hope the amendment will be defeated, because
it's taking away freedom that we have had formerly .... Cer-
tainly, I do not believe the people of this state would ratify the
document that seeks to take away the right that we enjoy now
and have struggled for all through the centuries. I don't believe
Missouri would take the backward step, I certainly don't, and I
hope this amendment will be defeated.
28
Mr. Righter was subsequently granted permission to withdraw his
amendment and thereafter offered a new one in lieu thereof so that the
amendment might conform to Mr. Wood's previous objections of pre-
venting city employees the right of organization:
Mnh. RIGHTER: Now, Mr. President, I offer an amendment to Mr.
Wood's Substitute and that amendment reads as follows. 'Pro-
vided however, that the right of collective bargaining shall not
apply to the state, or any sub-division or municipality thereof.'
It does not by its terms exclude the right of employees of the
state or any sub-division to organize.
(Amendment brought forward.)
PRESmDENT: Question is on the amendment. Any discussion? Is
there a second to the motion to amend?
(The motion was seconded by Mr. Ford.) 29
Mr. Wood's comment immediately thereafter shows the very broad
meaning which he affixed to the words "collective bargaining":
MR. WOOD (OF GREENE): Mr. President, I can see no reason of
cluttering up the Constitution with this ambiguous language.
Again you tell city employees and state employees and municipal
employees that, 'You shall not engage in collective bargaining.'
Now, collective bargaining means a good many things. When you
sit down at a table, representative of the employees of the city
sits down at a table and discusses the matter concerning employee
relations between an employee and the city, that is collective
bargaining. If this amendment is adopted, no representative of
any employees of the city could sit down and bargain with the
city officials. Now, a city water company belongs to the peo-
ple .... 30
28. Id. at 1968.
29. Id. at 1969.
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There follows collateral discussion of a very broad nature which is
unnecessary to set out herein because nowhere in these discussions can
one find even a reasonable inference that the supporters of the Wood sub-
stitute intended to create, if adopted, any affirmative duty toward collec-
tive bargaining on the part of employers, either in a private or public
capacity. The Righter amendment subsequently failed on vote of the
convention. Then the new Wood substitute was immediately thereafter
voted upon without further comment. Therefore, we can say that the
"New York provision" was never offered in and of itself on its own
merit, nor was it squarely discussed by the members of this convention
so as to provide the reader of these minutes with any direct meaning
attached to the specific provision. However, there are perhaps reasonable
indirect conclusions that may be drawn from the discussion on the first
day set out heretofore. These observations will be noted later.
For the record, the final approval of the convention of the Wood
amendment is set forth as stated:
Pmsmxr: Clerk will read the Substitute by Mr. Wood.
(The Clerk read as follows:)
SuBsTUTE No. 2 FOR S.cTIoN I. Amend File No. 10, Page 1,
Line one to six, inclusive; by striking out Section I and inserting
in lieu thereof; 'Employees shall have the right to organize and
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.'
(Roll call was taken.)
PRESIDENT: The result is forty seven aye, twelve no. The Sub-
stitute is approved.31
After the adoption thereof, a motion to strike the provision was
presented and defeated, but the following comment appears in the dis-
cussion of this motion which indicates that again nothing more was in-
tended to be added by the adoption thereof:
Muis. BRowN (OF CARROLL): I just want to briefly say a word in
support of the motion to strike. I will say in the first place that
I am just as good a friend of labor as Mr. Wood or any other
member of this Convention. I do not think that this section, if
adopted as voted, gives labor any right it does not now have
under the Constitution.32
31. Paocmminms 1971.
32. Id. at 1973.
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Thus ended two days of debates on the provision that is now article
I, section 29 of the Mdissouri constitution. While MX. Wood and his
supporters, from the inception of the original to the final provision as
adopted, no doubt were thinking in terms of organized labor and did give
labor definitions to the words therein, rather than the standard definition,
a conclusion cannot necessarily be drawn, even with this being admitted,
that organized labor was granted, or even wanted to create, any new
rights therefrom. Mr. Wood stated that the provision should be adopted
by the state merely as a matter of public policy.33 Further, Mdr. Wood
admitted that 'by' this simple line in our constitution we do not establish
the right of labor. Those rights are already established. When answering
Mr. Damron's question,34 Mr. Wood certainly stated the real under-
standable reason, in my opinion, as it was possibly understood by the
majority of the delegates. He said in answer to the question, (what rights
or powers, if any, do you seek to obtain by this proposal that you do not
now have?) "We will preclude the possibility and the probability as
has happened in the past, in future sessions of the legislature, many bills
being introduced seeking to destroy collective bargaining."
Apparently, if Mr. Shepley had not "bargained" with Mr. Wood by
indicating that he would withdraw his police power amendment providing
the Wood provision read as the New York provision, the New York
provision would never have entered the picture. This to me is the real
reason we have these particular words in section 29 today rather than
any particularly significant intent or meaning which Mdr. Wood and his
supporters attached to the particular words. All Mr. Wood, seemingly
in the common sense understanding, wanted was to prohibit the legisla-
ture from passing future adverse legislative enactments thereby prohibit-
ing the "taking away" of the rights which labor had at that time, and it
was never intended that the provision create any new right. Admittedly,
however, his group could have had a "latent" intent as was pointed out
in earlier comments.
Further, this prohibitive meaning was manifested in the conversation
between Mr. Brown and Mr. Wood,35 wherein Mr. Wood also indicated
that he had no intent to take away the employer's right to discharge his
employee by this provision, therefore negating any implication of a newly
33. Id. at 1937.
34. Id. at 1941.
35. Id. at 50.
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created right of discharge that could possibly be construed from the
provision standing alone; and further asserted again the sole need for
protection from the legislature. Mr. Shepley, who originally opposed the
Wood provision, supported it later because apparently he was convinced
that the legislature had questioned their rights and that these rights
should be protected therefrom. In addition, he stated he thought this
provision was only a statement of a fundamental right and no more; to
go further than a mere statement of the fundamental right was an im-
possible task for the constitutional convention, for that was a task pro-
perly left to the legislature. 36
While there were inferences in connection with the discussion of
the Righter amendment"' that there was danger of the creation of some
absolute right by constitutional fiat, these inferences cannot be given a
great deal of weight in the overall picture in view of the fact that only a
few of the delegates were learned in the problems of labor and those
learned gentlemen had expressly stated to the other delegate that the pro-
vision was only a "protective" measure for the prevention of the loss of
any then existing rights. Mr. Wood expressly referred to "the right that
we enjoy now." So also with respect to the broad language used by Mr.
Wood in spelling out the meaning of collective bargaining-he admitted
that it meant a good many things, though possibly because he was a
"labor expert", he could have meant the term in the sense of only the
collective bargaining process as it is understood when referring specifi-
cally to labor law; but were the other delegates aware of such implica-
tions? I believe the answer is obviously in the negative. Therefore, it
would appear unreasonable to assume that the majority of the delegates
at the convention, when they voted and adopted this provision that is
now section 29, intended it to mean anything but a constitutionally
asserted fundamental right adopted as a manifestation of the state's public
policy to prevent the future legislatures from enacting laws that would
take away the then existing rights of organized labor. Therefore, we
surely cannot conclude from these debates that any new rights were
thereby intended to be created insofar as the majority of the members
of the constitutional convention were concerned. What the people of
Missouri thought and intended when they voted on this provision is a
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Even if we admit insofar as the constitutional convention is con-
cerned that section 29 was never intended to have any self-executing
effect, we have gained but little as to the real meaning. For in the final
analysis, it is the courts that affix the true meaning to which all must
give obedient note, and a review of those cases considered by the courts
must be left for another time.
In concluding any answer to the bare premise it would seem that
in view of the foregoing we can only safely and apparently correctly state
that we should give force only to the common standard understanding
of those words in article I, section 29 and hold in effect that the provision
was only a written assertion of the then existing rights thereby adding
nothing new so as to create any different rights in law except a con-
stitutionally asserted guaranty of protection from future adverse legis-
lative enactments, a fortiori leaving the employee to such actions as
he may have had at common law. To hold otherwise would be to throw
down the shield, periodically face the sword, and forever constantly have
the menace of machicolation.
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